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ABSTRACT 
Is the Provision of More Timely Earnings Information Good for the Chinese Stock 
Market? 
Evidence from Investor Reactions to Management Earnings Forecasts 
by 
ZHAO Shunan 
Master of Philosophy 
Since 2001, publicly listed companies in China have been required by the Chinese 
Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the Shanghai Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Exchange to issue management earnings forecasts when they anticipate 
that earnings will be negative or change substantially from the previous period. This 
study examines the consequences and implications of this disclosure regulation. I 
find that the earnings forecasts are associated with an earlier incorporation of 
relevant earnings information into stock prices. However, I also find evidence that is 
consistent with the presence of overreactions to forecasts of extreme earnings 
changes. My study offers a cautionary note about the policy of mandating listed 
firms to issue earnings forecasts in a stock market that is dominated by individual 
investors.   
 
 
DECLARATION 
I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, 
and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have 
been duly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
( ZHAO Shunan ) 
                                                                                               May 3, 2012 
 

i 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER 2．RESEARCH BACKGROUND ................................................................................................ 8 
2.1 MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECAST REGULATION IN THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET ........................................ 8 
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE ....................................................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 3. DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................. 15 
CHAPTER 4. INFORMATION CONTENT OF MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS ............................. 24 
4.1 MARKET REACTIONS AROUND MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS ........................................................ 24 
4.2 MARKET REACTIONS AROUND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS ................................................................... 27 
CHAPTER 5. OVERREACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS ................ 31 
5.1 THE SHORT WINDOW AND THE LONG WINDOW RETURNS ...................................................................... 31 
5.2 MORE EVIDENCE ABOUT THE STRONGER MARKET REACTIONS ................................................................. 37 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 42 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 44 
TABLES .................................................................................................................................................. 46 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I sincerely acknowledge my supervisor, Dr. Man-lai (Sonia) Wong and Prof. Michael 
Firth, who provide me inspiring ideas and valuable advices with extraordinary 
patience and consistent encouragement during all the stages of my MPhil studies. 
Without their strong support, my thesis cannot have been the present form. I would 
like to also express my gratitude to Dr. Yuanyuan Zhang, Prof. Dean Tjosvold, Dr. 
Joseph Cheng, and Dr. Jin Gao for all the help they provided to me during the last 
two years. Furthermore, I wish to extend my appreciation to all the seminar 
participants at Lingnan University for their valuable comments on my research. 
Finally, I want to thank the staff at the Finance and Insurance Department, especially 
Ms Clara Hui, and all my dear friends and my family for your support all the time. 
 
1 
 
Is the Provision of More Timely Earnings Information Good for the 
Chinese Stock Market?  
Evidence from Investor Reactions to Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
My thesis examines the reactions of investors to the issuance of management 
earnings forecasts in the Chinese stock market. A management earnings forecast is a 
managerial disclosure that estimates the forthcoming earnings information of a 
specific firm. If an earnings forecast contains information about a firm’s future 
earnings and market participants are able to trade on this information without 
suffering from cognitive biases, an earnings forecast is able to reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and improve stock market efficiency by 
allowing inside information to be incorporated into stock prices earlier (Hirst et al. 
2008; Healy and Palepu 2001). However, recent studies on corporate disclosures 
suggests that more timely disclosure of corporate information can also lead to 
increased fluctuations in stock prices due to the presence of speculative activities and 
cognitive biases on the part of investors (Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Smith 2010).  
While investor reactions to management earnings forecasts in mature markets 
have been the focus of intensive scholarly investigation (Waymire 1984; Pownall et 
al. 1993; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Tawatnuntachai and Yaman 2007), there is very 
little evidence that pertains to emerging stock markets. My study helps fill this gap in 
the literature by empirically examining how investors react to management earnings 
forecasts in the biggest emerging market -- China. The research is motivated by the 
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fact that there are significant differences between China and more mature markets in 
terms of the information environment and investor clienteles. The information 
environment of the Chinese stock market is weak despite the adoption of the US-
style and European-style accounting, auditing, and governance standards (Piotroski 
and Wong 2011; Gul, Kim, and Qin 2010). The weak information environment is the 
result of a poor legal framework that offers little protection to minority investors 
(Jiang et al. 2010; Liu and Lu 2007), the presence of an underdeveloped financial 
intermediary sector, and the absence of a free and independent public media 
(Bushman et al. 2004; Piotroski and Wong, 2011).  
Consistent with a weak information environment, Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang 
(2010) found that the negative skewness in daily excess return is significantly greater 
than the global average due to the insufficient release of information about bad 
outcomes. Furthermore, stock prices in China exhibit strong momentum effects 
because of the delayed impounding of firm-specific information or stock price 
manipulation (Kang, Liu, and Ni 2002; Naughton, Truong, and Veeraraghavan 2008; 
He and Su 2009). 
Both the Shanghai Exchange and the Shenzhen Exchange require Chinese listed 
companies to issue earnings forecasts if managers believe there is likely to be a loss 
or a big change in profits. However, previous studies from behavioral finance 
suggest that the provision of management earnings forecasts may not necessarily be 
able to reduce information asymmetry and promote the efficiency of the stock market. 
In a weak information environment where firm-specific information is scarce, the 
issuance of management earnings forecasts can easily capture the attention of 
investors. To the extent that the earnings forecasts dominate shareholders’ attention 
spans due to the scarcity of competing and alternative information, the provision of 
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earnings forecasts can lead to excessive trading and misvaluations of the companies 
that issued the forecasts (Barber and Odean 2008; Da et al. 2011).  
In addition to the information environment, the investor clienteles of the Chinese 
stock market is also different from those in mature markets. Compared with the US 
stock market where institutions control 80 percent or more of the outstanding shares, 
the Chinese stock market is dominated by individual investors who have limited 
investment experience (Ng and Wu 2006). Although inexperienced individual 
investors are more susceptible to cognitive biases and are prone to the optimism that 
fuels stock price bubbles (Vissing-Jorgensen 2003; Greenwood and Negal 2009; 
Nelson et al. 2011), recent studies on individual investor behaviors also suggest that 
they do pay significant attention to earnings information and trade on this 
information (Lerman 2010, Cohen et al. 2010; Lawrence 2011). Thus, I expect that 
the provision of earnings forecasts may capture the attention of individual investors 
and create an investor sentiment around firms that have issued the earnings forecasts. 
This can lead to mispricings of the disclosing firms.  
In light of the above two considerations, the findings from management earnings 
forecast research in mature markets are unlikely to automatically translate to the 
China setting and investor reactions to a firm’s disclosures in China may display 
some unique behavioral characteristics. To investigate this issue, I examine whether 
management earnings forecasts contain earnings-relevant information and, more 
importantly, whether investors in China underreact or overreact to earnings forecasts. 
If management forecasts provide relevant earnings information to investors, we 
should observe significant market reactions around the forecast disclosure period and 
weaker market returns during the earnings announcement period for the firms that 
have issued management earnings forecasts (hereafter I refer to firms that have 
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issued management earnings forecasts as disclosing firms) than for the firms that 
have not issued such earnings forecasts (hereafter I refer to firms that have not issued 
management earnings forecasts as non-disclosing firms). The weaker reactions to 
earnings announcements are caused by the earlier incorporation of at least part of the 
earnings information into stock prices through management earnings forecasts. In 
addition, I also compare the stock returns of disclosing firms and non-disclosing 
firms over various event windows that cover the events of the earnings forecasts as 
well as earnings announcements, with the objective of investigating whether the 
provision of earnings forecasts are associated with stronger reactions from investors 
than would otherwise be the case.  
Based on a sample of 9,419 firm-quarter observations that provide management 
earnings forecasts before large earnings surprises during the period from the end of 
2001 to the third quarter of 2010, I find significant cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) around management earnings forecasts announcements, with the signs being 
consistent with the direction of the earnings forecasts. Furthermore, I also find a 
weaker reaction to the earnings announcements made by disclosing firms than those 
of non-disclosing firms. These findings are consistent with those reported by Penman 
(1980), Waymire (1984), and Skinner (1994) for US markets, and suggest that the 
management earnings forecasts in China contain price relevant information. 
To investigate whether investors in China overreact to earnings forecasts, I first 
employ propensity score matching to address the possible self-selection problems 
inherent in the decision to make a forecast, and then conduct my investigation based 
on a comparison of the treatment group (disclosing firms) and its matched group 
(matched non-disclosing firms). I find, as did Kasznik and Lev (1995) for the US 
market, that the CARs of disclosing firms with extremely bad news are significantly 
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lower than those of matched non-disclosing firms within a 10-day combined window 
that includes both the management earnings forecast and the earnings announcement. 
However, different from the results reported by Kasznik and Lev (1995) for the US 
market, I also find that the CARs of disclosing firms with extremely good news are 
significantly larger than those of matched non-disclosing firms within the same 
combined short window. Furthermore, the stronger reactions to disclosing firms with 
extremely good earnings news remain significant over a 120-day event window, 
while the stronger market reactions for disclosing firms with extremely bad earnings 
news vanishes.  
Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2007) suggest that the difference between 
disclosing firms and non-disclosing firms may be due to investors’ anticipation of the 
long-term performance of the firms. I therefore also control for the future long-run 
operating performance and stock return performance to capture investors’ 
expectations of the firms’ future performances in the regression models for detecting 
for the possible presence of shareholder overreaction. My results show that there is a 
significant positive relation between investors’ reactions to earnings announcements 
and the firms’ future operating performances. However, the differences in CARs 
between disclosing firms and the matched non-disclosing firms remain significant. 
Furthermore, I also find a negative association between the CARs and the stock 
return performance of the following year for the disclosing firms. The negative 
relation is consistent with the presence of a price reversal, which in turn suggests that 
investors might have overreacted to the earnings forecast within both the 10-day 
combined window and the 120-day long window. 
In order to provide more evidence about the return reversal in the short term, I 
further examine the post-earnings-announcement drifts of the disclosing and matched 
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non-disclosing firms. The average CARs of non-disclosing firms in the 20 days 
following the earnings announcement tend to be indifferent from 0. The average 
CARs of disclosing firms within the same window are, however, significant with 
signs that are opposite to the directions of earnings surprises. More specifically, for 
disclosing firms with extremely negative earnings surprises, the average CAR [2, 20] 
is significantly positive; for disclosing firms with extremely positive earnings 
surprises, the average CAR [2, 20] is significantly negative. Such a price movement 
is again consistent with the hypothesis that investors in China overreact to 
management earnings forecasts within the short combined window and the 
overreaction is partially reversed after the earnings announcements.  
I attribute the investor overreaction to investors’ excessive attention to disclosing 
firms in the Chinese stock market. Similar to Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) and 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I find significant associations between stock returns 
and whether these management earnings forecasts are made on a Friday, as well as 
the number of competing news on the forecast issue day. The stronger reactions to 
disclosing firms are also related to the bull-or-bear market conditions and the 
proportion of institutional ownership. 
My study offers systematic evidence on the consequences and implications of 
the policy of mandating publicly listed firms to issue management earnings forecasts 
in China. In addition to enhancing our understanding of the Chinese stock market, 
this thesis also resonates with the long-standing debates on whether more disclosures 
can actually benefit the functioning of a capital market (Benston 1973; Coffee 1984; 
Depoers 2000). In particular, my study adds a dose of caution to the policy of 
mandating publicly listed firms to issue management earnings forecasts in a stock 
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market that is dominated by inexperienced minority shareholders and operates under 
a weak information environment and severe short-sale constraints.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I give a brief 
summary of the requirements to make earnings forecasts in China and discuss 
relevant previous studies. The data and variables are described in Chapter 3. Chapter 
4 examines the information content of management earnings forecasts and Chapter 5 
examines investor overreactions for disclosing firms. The conclusions are presented 
in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2．Research Background 
 
2.1 Management earnings forecast regulation in China 
Unlike the US stock market, management earnings forecasts in China are rarely 
disclosed voluntarily by the publicly listed firms. Instead, firms make forecasts when 
they are mandated to do so under the regulations of the China Securities Regulation 
Commission (CSRC) and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges. At the end of 2001, 
the Shanghai Exchange and the Shenzhen Exchange introduced rules that require 
management to make earnings forecasts if they expect to report a financial loss or 
expect gross profit to change dramatically (where managers expect a change in 
earnings of greater than absolute 50%) 1 . One year later in 2002, the Shanghai 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Exchange further required that listed firms not only 
disclose management earnings forecasts for the annual earnings but also for the 
interim and third quarter earnings. This regulation also specified the period for which 
a firm is required to forecast. In addition, the criteria changed from gross profit to net 
profit. In 2006, the regulators further required that if a firm believes it may turn from 
loss-making to profit-making it should make a forecast. This regulation 
recommended that listed firms extend their forecast period to 12 months in advance 
of their earnings announcements if they have such forecasting capability. Table 1 
gives a brief summary of the evolution process of the management earnings forecast 
regulations in the Chinese stock market since 2001. 
[Insert Table 1] 
                                                            
1 A firm with relatively low earnings per share last year (smaller than RMB 0.05 per share for annual 
earnings, RMB 0.03 per share for interim earnings and RMB 0.04 per share for the third quarter 
earnings) can be exempted from this requirement after obtaining special approval from the relevant 
stock exchanges. 
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With respect to management earnings forecast characteristics, and according to 
the introductory form of the management earnings forecast for listed firms given by 
the Shenzhen Exchange, an earnings forecast should include four parts: a forecast of 
future earnings, the net profit and earning per share of the corresponding report of 
last year, the attribution for earnings changes, and additional relevant information. In 
the part of a forecast of future earnings, a firm has to provide a general statement 
indicating a short description of the forecast. The database on management earnings 
forecasts is provided by CSMAR. Based on the short general descriptions of the 
forecasts provided by the listed firms, the database classifies the earnings forecasts 
into ten types: uncertainty, slight decrease (less than 50%), slight increase (less than 
50%), stop loss making, loss for the first time, loss again, profit again, substantial 
decrease (greater than 50%), substantial increase (greater than 50%), and others in 
the sample period. Among them, stop loss making, loss for the first time, loss again, 
substantial decrease and increase are the conditions under which firms are required 
by regulators to issue management earnings forecasts.  
If a firm reports a loss (for the first time or a subsequent time) or reports ceasing 
loss making, it is required to disclose the estimated loss number or profit number. If a 
firm expects a substantial decrease or increase, it is required to disclose the estimated 
extent of the earnings change. However, most of the sample firms only estimate a 
range for their future earnings rather than provide an exact estimated value. 
Furthermore, many firms just issued a short description of the earnings forecast 
without providing any other information. Some studies have found that the investors’ 
reactions to earnings forecasts can be influenced by the characteristics of forecasts 
(such as range vs. exact estimate). In this study, I classify an earnings forecast 
according to its short description (that is the type of forecasts as provided by 
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CSMAR). Due to data availability, I am not able to further classify the forecasts 
according to their other characteristics.  
 
2.2 Related Literature 
According to Hirst et al. (2008), management earnings forecasts are voluntary 
managerial disclosures predicting earnings prior to the expected reporting data. Some 
researchers use the term “earnings guidance” synonymously with “earnings 
forecasts”. In China, management earnings forecasts are typically not a voluntary 
disclosure. Instead, they are mandatory disclosures as required by regulators. In the 
studies that focus on the US market, forecasts that are provided after the end of 
accounting period but before the announcement of earnings are typically referred to 
as earnings preannouncements. I do not distinguish between management earnings 
forecasts and earnings preannouncements in this study. Another concept which is 
closely related to this study is earnings warnings (Kazsnik and Lev 1995) or profit 
warnings (Bulkley and Herrerias 2005). This is a description that analysts or 
journalists give to an unscheduled corporate announcement that earnings for a 
specified future quarter will fall short of current expectations. 
In many countries, management earnings forecasts are voluntary disclosures 
issued by publicly listed firms. According to Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981), 
publicly listed firms have an incentive to disclose their private information to 
outsiders as a lack of disclosure is taken as bad news by the less informed party. 
However, empirically, a host of factors associated with the costs and benefits of 
earnings forecasts can influence the disclosure decisions of a manager. Healy and 
Palepu (2001), for example, argue that the demand for financial reports and 
disclosures arises from information asymmetry and the agency problem between 
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managers and outsiders. Specifically, they summarize that there are at least 6 factors 
that can affect managers’ disclosure decisions. They are capital markets transactions 
(Lang and Lundholm 1993; Healy et al. 1999), corporate control contest (Brennan 
1999), stock compensation (Aboody and Kasznik 2000), litigation cost (Skinner 
1994, 1997), and management talent signaling (Trueman 1986), proprietary cost 
(Newman and Sansing 1993; Gigler 1994).  
The Chinese stock market has a less litigious environment than that of the US 
market. Based on a comparison between the Canadian stock market, which also has a 
less litigious environment, and the US stock market, Baginski et al. (2002) have 
shown that Canadian listed firms have a higher tendency to disclose management 
earnings forecasts. Furthermore, the proportion of good news forecasts is higher in 
Canada than in the US. Zhang and Zhang (2011) examine the determinants of the 
disclosure decision in China. They found that the most pronounced factors affecting 
firms’ disclosure decisions in China are external financing needs, management talent 
signaling, and stock compensation, but there is no concern for litigation risk. 
In addition to examining the motives of disclosure, scholars are also interested in 
investigating how investors react to the issuance of management earnings forecasts. 
Management earnings forecasts were not always considered to be value relevant even 
in mature stock markets (Hirst et al. 2008). Early research questioned whether 
investors rely on management earnings forecasts when making their decisions since 
they are subjective and unaudited. However, from the 1970s and the early 1980s, 
more and more studies provide evidence that management earnings forecasts do have 
information content. The abnormal stock returns around the forecast disclosure day 
are significantly positive (negative) for good (bad) news management forecasts 
(Waymire 1984). Investors’ reactions to management earnings forecasts are similar 
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to their reactions to earnings announcements (Ball and Brown 1968; Foster 1977). 
For example, Ball and Brown (1968) found that good news (bad news) annual 
earnings announcements are associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns 
around time of the annual earnings announcement. 
However, Kasznik and Lev (1995) argue that investors may not incorporate the 
information in earnings forecasts without bias. When they examine how investors in 
the US stock market react to earnings warnings (one type of earnings forecasts) prior 
to a large earnings surprise, they found that, for the firms with extremely negative 
earnings surprises, the combined market return over the 5-day warning window and 
the 5-day earnings announcement window is significantly lower for warning firms 
than for non-warning firms. They argued that, as one of the explanations, investors 
may have overreacted to the earnings warnings. 
Several researchers have also examined the anomaly identified by Kasznik and 
Lev (1995) but they offer evidence that is inconsistent with the presence of 
overreaction. If the stronger reaction proposed by Kasznik and Lev (1995) indicates 
overreaction, then there should be a long-term price reversal after earnings 
announcements. Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2007) find no significant stock returns 
for the disclosing firms in the 1 and 3 years after the earnings announcements, which 
is inconsistent with overreaction. They also find that the short-term stock return is 
positively related with the firms’ long-run operating performance. As a result, they 
tend to attribute the stronger reactions identified by Kasznik and Lev (1995) to 
investors’ anticipation of firms’ long-term performance. From a different angle, 
Tucker (2007) investigates whether the stronger reactions documented by Kasznik 
and Lev (1995) are driven by a self-selection problem. He finds that after controlling 
for firms’ self-selection, disclosing firms’ returns remain lower than the non-
13 
 
disclosing firm in a combined short-term window. However, there is no difference 
between these two types of firms in a longer window of 3 months.  
With the above studies as a background, this study examines how investors react 
to the provision of earnings forecasts in China, a country which is dominated by 
inexperienced investors who are investing in a weak information environment. 
Inexperienced investors are believed to base their trading decisions on personal 
beliefs and sentiment rather than financial disclosure. While there is abundant 
evidence on how inexperienced investors are plagued by cognitive biases and 
investor sentiment (Smith 2010; Stambaugh et al. 2012), recent studies also indicate 
that they do pay attention to firms’ financial disclosures (Lawrence 2011; Lerman 
2010). For example, Lerman (2010) finds that discussion activity in online message 
boards increased significantly around earnings release dates. In this study, I offer 
additional insights into the reactions of individual investors to financial disclosure by 
examining whether and how they respond to management earnings forecasts.  
Odean (1999) proposes that investors limit their investment decisions to stocks 
that have recently caught their attention and this hypothesis was tested by Barber and 
Odean (2008). These authors find that individual investors indeed demonstrate 
attention-driven buying behaviors as they tend to buy stocks that are mentioned in 
the news, on high-volume days, and on the day after both extremely negative and 
extremely positive one-day returns. In a recent paper, Koester et al. (2011) propose 
that managers may intentionally hold up good information about their companies and 
create “positive extreme earnings surprises” artificially so as to attract investors’ 
attention. They offer evidence that the firms that produce positive extreme surprises 
tend to be those with “neglected” firm characteristics, which is consistent with the 
attention-grabbing hypothesis. Similarly, Smith (2010) also finds that inexperienced 
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investors tend to respond aggressively to additional firm-related disclosures. This 
also suggests that firm-related disclosure is able to capture their attention.  
I expect that the firms disclosing management earnings forecasts, such as 
extremely good (bad) earnings changes, may also capture the attention of investors 
and this influences their trading decisions. Barber and Odean (2008) suggest that the 
attention effect will be stronger if investors have fewer information resources. Thus, 
I expect the attention effects to be relatively stronger in China than in more mature 
markets because of its relatively weak information environment.  
Previous studies find stronger reactions only for the disclosing firms with 
extremely bad news but not good news (Kasznik and Lev 1995). Miller (1977) 
argues that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing since pessimistic 
investors do not take adequate short positions due to institutional or behavioral 
reasons. Thus, overpricing is more significant under the existence of short-sale 
constraints (Berkman and Koch 2008). Stambaugh et al. (2012) further show that 
such overpricing tendency will be intensified in the presence of market-wide 
sentiment. The Chinese stock market is characterized by the presence of severe short-
sale constraints. Therefore, I expect that the stock market reactions in China, if they 
exist, will be stronger for the disclosing firms with extremely good news rather than 
bad news.  
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Chapter 3. Data, Sample and variable description 
 
All the data used in this paper are from China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. The sample period is from the end of 2001 to the third 
quarter of 2010. To ensure the accuracy of the forecast and earnings announcement 
dates, I follow DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and use the databases provided by 
another data supplier – WIND to conduct cross-checking. I drop the observations 
whose announcement dates are different across the two databases (1,305 
observations) or the observations that only appeared in the CSMAR database but not 
the database provided by WIND (this results in 1,263 observations being excluded). 
To distinguish between the market reactions to different earnings announcements, 
firm-quarter observations are deleted if a firm makes multiple earnings 
announcements on the same day (for example, a firm may announce its first quarter 
report and the annual report on the same day. This results in 4,102 observations 
being deleted). I also truncate sample outliers (top and bottom 1%). The whole 
sample consists of 40,022 firm-quarter observations. 
I follow Kasznik and Lev (1995) and focus on management earnings forecasts 
that disclose extremely positive or negative earnings surprises. We can expect that 
forecasts of large earnings surprises are more necessary for investors than other kinds 
of forecasts. Consistent with this expectation, there are disproportionately more 
management forecasts disclosing extreme earnings surprises2 . Besides, relatively 
larger earnings surprises provide more information to investors, so the corresponding 
market reactions are stronger and more likely to be statistically significant than that 
                                                            
2  If I use all available management earnings forecasts, they share similar distribution and other 
statistical characteristics as extreme earnings surprise sample presenting in Table 2, 4, and 5 below. 
The same conclusion in the next chapter can be drawn. 
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of smaller earnings surprises. To compare market reactions between disclosing firms 
and non-disclosing firms, the extreme earnings surprise sample may be better serve 
my purpose. I divide the whole sample into 10 equal subsamples (SURs) according 
to their earnings surprises, and define observations with extremely negative (positive) 
earnings surprises if they fall into earnings surprise groups where SUR=1 or 2 
(SUR=9 or 10). This yields a sample of 9419 management earnings forecasts.  
To estimate the unexpected earning surprise, most studies investigating the US 
stock market use the measure of the deflated difference between actual earnings and 
the consensus of analysts’ earnings forecasts. However, there are several reasons 
why this measure is unsuitable for the Chinese stock market. First, in the Chinese 
stock market, the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is low. Chang et al. (2000) 
provide evidence on analyst activity and performance in 47 countries around the 
world, including 15 emerging market economies. They find that analyst forecast 
error is significantly lower when a country has an English legal code, a large analyst 
community, and when stock return variation is low. Moreover, the forecast 
dispersion is significantly lower when a country has a large analyst community and 
an English legal code. Unfortunately, the Chinese stock market meets none of the 
above conditions. Chang et al. (2000) find that China is ranked in the top 5 countries 
in terms of forecast error and dispersion. Ang and Ma (1999) find that the aggregate 
analyst forecast errors for the Chinese firms are around twice that of the Hong Kong 
companies. Possible reasons for the low accuracy of analyst forecasts are several 
folds: insufficient information, lack of analysis skills, conflict of interest, and so on 
(Guo and Hong 2009; Hu and Wong 2011). Recently, Lin (2010) and Yue and Lin 
(2008) find that analysts’ forecasts in China are more accurate than statistical models 
based on historical annual data, but they are less accurate than statistical models 
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based on historical quarterly data. This suggests that analysts are not particularly 
good in forecasting earnings. 
Second, analysts and financial institutions are relatively fewer in the Chinese 
stock market because of the short history of the market. According to the available 
forecast data in CSMAR database, analysts typically forecast earnings only for big 
firms and for annual reports. If I use analysts’ forecasts to estimate earnings surprises, 
I will be forced to substantially reduce the sample size for my investigation. 
Last but not the least, a seasonal random walk hypothesis about earnings process 
may better fit the stock pricing in China. As I mentioned above, the Chinese stock 
market is dominated by individual investors. Compared to investors from more 
mature markets such as NYSE or NASDQ, individual investors in China are more 
inexperienced and less sophisticated. Walther (1997) finds that for firms with more 
sophisticated investors, the earnings-announcement-related returns are more closely 
associated with analyst forecasts. However, the earnings-announcement-related 
returns are more closely associated with time-series model forecasts for firms with 
less sophisticated investors. Bartov et al. (2000) investigate the relationship between 
the stock returns after earnings announcements and the institutional ownership, 
which is a proxy for the sophistication of investors. Following Bernard and Thomas 
(1990) and others, they assume unsophisticated investors fail to observe the true 
process that underlies earnings and misperceive it as a seasonal random walk. Their 
empirical findings are consistent with their hypothesis – a negative association 
between institutional ownership and post-announcement abnormal returns. The 
seasonal random walk model of the earnings process is widely used in studies of the 
Chinese stock market (Chen et al. 2002; Su 2003; Haw et al. 2000). 
18 
 
In light of the above evidence, I follow Hou et al. (2008) and use the 
standardized earnings’ change to measure earnings surprise. Specifically, the earning 
surprise for stock i in quarter t is 
ti
titi
ti
ee
SUE
,
4,,
, 

 
Where tie ,  is the earnings per share of this quarter, 4, tie  is the earnings per share 
from the same quarter of last year, and ti,  is the standard deviation of earnings 
changes over the last eight quarters. 
I capture investors’ reactions by using the abnormal return surrounding the event 
date. I define abnormal return as the difference between the return of the announcing 
firm and that of a size and book-to-market matched portfolio: 
tptiti RRAR ,,,   
where tiR ,  is the raw return of stock i on date t, and tpR ,  is the return on the 
portfolio to which stock i belongs on date t. Following Hirshleifer et al. (2009), I 
form 25 portfolios according to firms’ size and book-to-market values. Firm size is 
defined as the market capitalization at the end of June every year, while the book-to-
market value is calculated based on the book value of equity and market 
capitalization at the end of the previous year. I divide the whole sample into 5 
portfolios according to firm size and book-to-market value, separately. So there are 
25 equal sized portfolios in the whole sample. Each observation is matched to one of 
these 25 portfolios. I use the portfolio average returns as the expected return for a 
particular stock. The cumulative abnormal return of each stock is calculated by the 
sum of abnormal returns over the event windows. 
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Table 2 provides a summary of the frequency of different types of management 
earnings forecasts. For convenience, each of them is given a type code ranging from 
1 to 10. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Types 6 to 10 correspond to the forecast conditions under which listed firms are 
mandated by the regulators to disclose management forecasts, and they account for 
more than 92% of all the management earnings forecasts. I define Types 3, 4, 9, 10 
as good news and Types 2, 6, 7, 8 as bad news. We can see from Table 2 that there 
are relatively more observations of good news than of bad news (5,433 versus 3,886). 
This is quite different from recent findings based on the US stock market where 
management forecast disclosures are more likely to disclose bad news (Kasznik and 
Lev 1995). However, the proportion of good to bad news in China is consistent with 
early US studies based on samples before the 1980s (Hirst et al. 2008). The relatively 
lower proportion of bad news forecasts are probably due to the fact that China’s 
stock market is operating in a less litigious environment and managers are therefore 
less conservative in their disclosures. Baginski et al. (2002) also find fewer bad news 
forecasts in Canada, which is also less litigious than the US. 
Table 3 shows the percentage of observations with management earnings 
forecasts in the groups of extremely negative and extremely positive earnings 
surprises. The percentage of forecast observations is a little higher than that of non-
disclosing observations (58.83% versus 41.17%). As expected, the disclosing 
percentage is higher in the groups with the most extreme negative and positive 
earnings (SUR=1 and 10) than that in the other groups (SUR=2 and 9). 
[Insert Table 3] 
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Table 4 shows the consistency of earnings surprises and management earnings 
forecasts. Here I only report the results for the forecast types mandated by the 
regulators (that is Types 6 - 10). I am less interested in Types 1 to 5 since each of 
them has very few observations and the main objective of this thesis is to offer 
evidence on the effects of the policy of mandating publicly listed firms to provide 
management forecasts. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The directions of the management earnings forecast and the earnings surprise are 
the same in most cases. This means that if the management forecast provides good 
(bad) news, then the following earnings change is more likely to be positive 
(negative). “loss again” forecasts can be consistent with both positive and negative 
SUE depending on the relative size of loss3. Although “loss again” forecasts may be 
taken as bad news literally, investors may compare this term’s loss with previous one 
to determine whether the operating performance has been improved. 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the time interval between the 
management earnings forecasts and earnings announcements in my sample. For the 
whole sample, the mean value of the time interval is 66.74 calendar days while the 
median is 63 calendar days. So the average time interval is around two months. I find 
that about 73.1% of the management earnings forecasts are disclosed within 3 
months before the actual earnings announcements.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Thus, when I examine the 120-day cumulative abnormal returns starting from 60 
days before the earnings announcements, they cover an almost 3-month stock price 
                                                            
3 If I drop the observations that belong to the type of “loss again” to avoid confusion, the results do 
not have major changes to alter my conclusion. 
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movement prior to the earnings announcement and about 73% of all management 
earnings forecasts fall into this event window in my sample. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
In order to more fully incorporate the market reactions to earnings forecasts, I 
control for the time interval between the management earnings forecasts and earnings 
announcements, and I only keep the disclosing observations in which the time 
interval is fewer than 75 calendar days or 60 calendar days when calculating CARs [-
60, 60] (as shown in Figure 1). The time period of CAR [-60, 60] starts from 60 
trading days before earnings announcements. Approximately, 60 trading days 
corresponds to 3 months while 75 calendar days corresponds to 2 months and a half 
and 60 calendar days corresponds to 2 months. Thus, for a firm who discloses an 
earnings forecast 75 calendar days in advance of its earnings announcement, the 
CAR [-60, 60] should incorporate about one-half-month stock returns before the 
forecast, and for a firm who discloses an earnings forecast 60 calendar days in 
advance of its earnings announcement, the CAR [-60, 60] should incorporate about 
one-month stock returns before the forecast. 
In the Chinese stock market, management earnings forecasts are regulated by the 
CSRC and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges. If we take the forecast Types 6 to 
10 as mandatory disclosures, we have already seen in Table 2 that over 92% of 
forecasts are mandated. However, the self-selection problem may still be a challenge 
in my sample because a manager does not have complete information about future 
earnings. Managers have to estimate whether the actual earnings for the period 
(which has not yet ended) will be substantially different from the prior period. This 
involves a lot of subjectivity and there is a lot of room for a manager to decide 
whether to issue a forecast or not. Moreover, a manager may opportunistically decide 
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to make a forecast in order to move the stock price up or down in the short term. 
There are various reasons why management might engage in opportunistic behavior. 
Because of this self-selection concern, I use the propensity score matching method to 
reduce the possible biases on the estimates when I compare the market returns of 
disclosing firms and non-disclosing firms. In the probit model that here uses to 
estimate the propensity score, I include variables that can simultaneously influence 
the disclosure decision and the stock return (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Thus, I 
include earnings surprise (SUE), firm size (LNCAP), book-to-market value (B2M), 
government control (GOV), profit volatility (PROVAR), leverage (LEV), and return 
on equity (ROE) as the explanatory variables in the probit model. I define firm size 
as the log of total market value of the firm, and the book-to-market value is 
calculated based on the book value to the market capitalization of equity at the end of 
the previous year. GOV is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is 
controlled by a state-owned entity and takes the value of 0 otherwise. Profit volatility 
is measured by the standard deviation of earnings over the last 8 quarters, and 
leverage is calculated by total debt divided by total assets. ROE is the ratio of net 
income to shareholders’ equity. Firm size and book-to-market value are widely 
employed factors to control for risk and transparency. Earnings surprise and profit 
volatility indicate the uncertainty of firm’s performance, and they measure the 
necessity of earnings forecasts. Leverage is taken as an indirect measure of firm’s 
outside financing demand, and ROE provides a proxy for a CEO’s ability. Piotroski 
et al (2010) also show that the incentive of political forces influence the issuance of 
financial information. So I add the state ownership dummy to control this impact. All 
of these variables are related with market reactions in the Chinese stock market (Gul 
et al. 2010; Firth et al. 2007). I also add the second order of the above variables and 
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their interaction terms in order to balance the covariates. For each forecast disclosing 
firm I perform a one-to-one matching from the non-disclosing firms with 
replacement. Table 6 presents the differences in firm characteristics between 
disclosing firms and their matched non-disclosing firms after the matching procedure 
for the extreme earnings surprise samples4. 
[Insert Table 6] 
As shown in Table 6, the differences in firm characteristics between disclosing 
firms and their matched non-disclosing firms are quite small, and there is no 
statistical difference between the disclosing group and the matched non-disclosing 
group for all the firm characteristics at the 10% significance level. It means that the 
disclosing firms and their matched firms share similar characteristics and the 
disclosing firms have been well matched. Following analysis on the differences in 
market reactions between disclosing and non-disclosing firms in the next two 
chapters are based on the disclosing firms and their matched non-disclosing firms. 
 
                                                            
4 The probit models in the propensity score matching are reported in the Appendix. 
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Chapter 4. Information Content of Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
The information content of management earnings forecasts can be reflected in the 
market reactions around the management forecast disclosure period and the earnings 
announcement period. During the management forecast disclosure period, if the 
management earnings forecasts are informative, we should observe significant 
market reactions with the signs being consistent with those of the forecasts. During 
the earnings announcement period, if the management earnings forecasts are 
informative, we should observe weaker market reactions for disclosing firms than for 
non-disclosing firms. This is because at least part of earnings information has been 
incorporated into the stock price at the time of the management earnings forecasts. 
Thus, the market reactions before the earnings announcements should be stronger for 
the forecast disclosing firms. 
 
4.1 Market Reactions around Management Earnings Forecasts 
This section examines the stock price reactions to management earnings forecasts 
within three different windows before, during, and after the disclosure day. In order 
to isolate the effects of a single management earnings forecast, I drop an observation 
if a firm issued multiple management forecasts on the same day. I also drop 
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observations in which the management earnings forecast is bundled with an actual 
earnings announcement. 
Table 7 reports the results. As I have explained before, this thesis only focuses on 
the forecasts that are mandated by the regulators (Types 6-10). The ‘Sign’ column 
gives the expected signs of the cumulative abnormal returns for the different types of 
earnings forecast. First, we see that stock prices react significantly to earnings 
forecasts and the prices move in the expected directions. Significant positive 
cumulative abnormal returns follow forecasts of an earnings increase and significant 
negative cumulative abnormal returns follow forecasts of an earnings decrease. This 
is consistent with previous studies indicating earnings forecasts are price informative 
(Penman 1980; Waymire 1984; Pownall et al. 1993). In un-tabulated results I find 
that the cumulative abnormal returns for Types 1 to 5 are not as significant as those 
for Types 6 to 10. In other words, management earnings forecasts which correspond 
to the situations listed in the regulation provision are more informative than those 
disclosed on a voluntary basis. 
[Insert Table 7] 
Second, stock price reactions after earnings forecasts are weaker than the price 
reactions before and during the earnings forecast period. Compared with CAR [-60, -
2] and CAR [-1, 1], CAR [2, 60] tends to be less significant. For example, for the 
Type 8 management forecast, a substantial earnings decrease, the average CARs 
before and during the earnings forecast period are statistically significant at -3.1% 
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and -2.4%, respectively. But the average CARs after the earnings forecasts is not 
significantly different from zero. This result contrasts with the US findings of 
Jackson and Madura (2003). They find negative valuation effects for profit warnings 
of bad news continue beyond the day on which the warnings are announced. The 
contrast may reflect that in China the stock prices react to earnings earlier and the 
entire life cycle of information moves forward due to serious information leakage. 
I find that before the formal disclosure of the earnings forecasts, market prices 
have already reacted to the forthcoming information as the CARs [-60, -2] are 
significant. In contrast with the dates of earnings announcements, which are 
scheduled (or can be reasonably predicted based on historical observations), 
investors don’t know when or if management will make an earnings forecast. It is 
difficult to predict when a forecast will be made. Thus, the early market reactions 
imply that some investors may be trading on the inside information. 
To measure whether the pre-forecast price reactions matter in magnitude, I 
compare the average CARs [-60, -2] with the whole 120-day average CARs around 
the earnings forecast CARs [-60, 60]. The results are presented in the last column of 
Table 7. As we can see, the ratios between average CARs [-60, -2] and average 
CARs [-60, 60] vary from 32.37% to 60.37%. This means that a relatively large part 
of market response occurs prior to the earnings forecast disclosure.  
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4.2 Market Reactions around Earnings Announcements 
Similar to other studies that investigate market reactions to earnings 
announcements, Table 8 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for 60-days before, 
3-days around, and 60-days after the earnings announcement day for disclosing firms 
and their matched non-disclosing firms. I compare the CARs of disclosing firms with 
those of matched non-disclosing firms within the extremely negative or extremely 
positive earnings surprise groups (SURs) in order to examine the impact of 
management earnings forecasts.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Three major patterns emerge from Table 8, all of which suggest that earnings 
forecasts provide relevant earnings information to investors. First, compared with 
their matched non-disclosing firms, the average CARs [-60,-2] of disclosing firms 
are significantly more negative if they have bad earnings news, and significantly 
more positive if they have good earnings news. Second, during the 3-day window 
around the earnings announcement, the stock price reactions of disclosing firms are 
weaker than those of the matched firms. While the corresponding CARs of the 
matched non-disclosing firms show significant market reactions, the average CARs 
[-1, 1] of the disclosing firms are statistically non-different from zero except for the 
group SUR=1. The differences in CARs between the disclosing and the matched 
non-disclosing firms are statistically significant. This is consistent with the 
preemption effect of management earnings forecasts noted by Skinner (1994). As for 
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the market returns after the earnings announcements, the average CARs [2, 60] of 
matched non-disclosing firms are significant with signs that are consistent with the 
earnings surprises. However, for the group SUR=1, SUR=9, or SUR=10, the average 
CARs [2, 60] of the disclosing firms are statistically indistinguishable from zero at 
conventional significance levels. The difference between the disclosing firms and the 
matched non-disclosing firms is statistically significant for the group SUR=2. 
The above results suggest that the earnings announcements of the matched non-
disclosing firms are more informative than those of disclosing firms due to the 
absence of earnings preannouncements for these firms. They indicate that 
management earnings forecasts advance the time of stock price reactions and allow 
investors to incorporate firms’ earnings information into prices earlier. 
In order to control for the possible sources of variation in the relationship 
between management earnings forecasts and the stock price movements around 
earnings announcements, I run regressions of the CARs within the above three 
windows on the forecast dummy (DUMMY), earnings surprise (SUE), and relevant 
control variables which are known to be critical in explaining market reactions to 
earnings surprises in China (Gul et al. 2010; Firth et al. 2007). The model 
specification is as follows: 
 
where  is the cumulative abnormal return within an event window of firm i; 
 is the forecast dummy which takes 1 for observations with management 
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earnings forecasts, and takes 0 otherwise;  is the measure of the earnings 
surprise for firm i;  refers to a vector of control variables including firm size 
(LNCAP), book-to-market value (B2M), momentum (MOM), profit volatility 
(PROVAR), leverage (LEV), return on equity (ROE) and state ownership (GOV). 
Firm size, book-to-market value, profit volatility, leverage, return on equity, and 
state ownership are defined earlier, while forecast dummy is set equal to 1 for 
observations with management earnings forecasts and is set equal to 0 otherwise. 
Momentum is measured by the stock return over the previous 12 months. I also 
control for year and industry effects by adding year and industry dummies. Table 9 
shows the regression results. 
[Insert Table 9] 
Here I am interested in the coefficient on the forecast dummy (DUMMY). In all 
of the regressions, I find that the coefficient on the forecast dummy is significant and 
its sign is consistent with my previous findings. For example, the coefficient on the 
dummy is 1.670 in regression 1 and is -1.208 in regression 2. This suggests that for 
disclosing firms with good news, the average CAR [-60, -2] will be larger than that 
of matched non-disclosing firms by 1.670%, while the average CAR [-1, 1] will be 
smaller than that of matched non-disclosing firms by 1.208%. These results are 
consistent with my earlier findings as reported in Table 8.  
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To sum up, according to the results reported in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9, I 
can draw the conclusion that management earnings forecasts do provide value 
relevant information to investors in the Chinese stock market. 
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Chapter 5. Overreactions Associated with Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
5.1 The Short Window and the Long Window Returns 
In this section, I investigate market returns over three different windows: a 10-
day combined short window, a 120-day long window, and a 20-day short window 
right after the earnings announcements. This will allow me to examine short-term 
and long-term overreactions. 
As for the combined short window, I follow Kasznik and Lev (1995) and 
calculate the CARs over the 5 days around the release of a management earnings 
forecast plus the CARs for the 5 days around the ensuing earnings announcement. 
For non-disclosing firms, because there is no release day of management earnings 
forecasts, I use the average 5-day abnormal returns during the event window [-60,-2] 
before earnings announcements to substitute for the 5-day returns around 
management forecasts. Table 10 shows the market returns in the 10-day combined 
window for the disclosing firms and for the matched non-disclosing firms. In my 
sample, the absolute values of the CARs of disclosing firms are significantly larger 
than those of matched firms, even that they have similar earnings surprises. The 
absolute value of the difference between the disclosing firms and the matched firms 
of the 10-day cumulative abnormal returns vary from 2.44% to 4.28%, which is large 
in such a short window. 
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[Insert Table 10] 
It should be noted that I find a stronger reaction for disclosing firms with 
extremely negative earnings surprises, which is similar to the findings reported in the 
US by Kasznik and Lev (1995). I, however, also find a stronger reaction for 
disclosing firms with extremely positive earnings surprises.  
A problem with above combined short window is that it may not be able to cover 
all the market reactions to earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. A longer 
window may serve that function better. Here, I calculate the cumulative abnormal 
return of the 120-day event window centered on the earnings announcement day. We 
have already seen from Table 5, that some firms have a very long forecast period so 
that even a 120-day event window is not long enough to capture the reactions 
covering both the events of forecasts and earnings announcements. Thus, in order to 
examine a more complete stock price reaction to management forecasts, I drop firm-
quarter observations whose time interval between the earnings forecast and the 
earnings announcement is larger than 75 calendar days or 60 calendar days. Table 11 
shows the CARs within the 120-day event window for disclosing firms and the 
matched non-disclosing firms, respectively. 
[Insert Table 11] 
For firms with extremely negative earnings surprises, the stronger market 
reactions to disclosing firms disappear at the conventional significance levels. 
However, there are still strong market returns associated with disclosing firms when 
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they have extremely positive news. The magnitude of this difference is around 4% to 
5%. 
Table 12 tests whether the above results are driven by a lack of critical controls 
through regression analysis. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
return within the 10-day combined window in regressions 1 and 2, and is the 
cumulative abnormal return of the 120-day long window in regressions 3 to 6.  
[Insert Table 12] 
For the 10-day combined window, the coefficient on the forecast dummy is 
significantly positive for firms with good news and significantly negative for firms 
with bad news, which means the 10-day market reaction of the disclosing firms is 
significantly stronger than that of the matched non-disclosing firms. The magnitude 
of the average return difference between the disclosing firms and matched non-
disclosing firms is still very large – around 4%. For the long window, the coefficient 
on the forecast dummy is only significant in regression 3 and regression 5, which 
means there is only a stronger market reaction for disclosing firms with extremely 
positive earnings surprises. The average 120-day CARs of the disclosing firms will 
be larger than that of the matched non-disclosing firms by about 3% if other factors 
are the same. 
Until now, my findings differ from those in previous studies conducted in 
mature stock markets in two main respects. First, the overreaction effect observed by 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) is only significant in the combined short window. However, 
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in my study, the stronger market reaction also exists in a 120-day long window. This 
means if the stronger reaction reflects investor overreaction to management earnings 
forecasts, then investors take a longer time to revise the overreaction in the China 
stock market. 120 days are not enough. Second, in the combined short window, the 
stronger stock price reaction occurs not only for disclosing firms with negative news 
but also for firms with positive earnings news. And the positive stronger price 
reaction is more prevalent – it still exists in the long window while the short-term 
negative stronger price reaction disappears. This is consistent with the arguments of 
Miller (1977) and Berkman and Koch (2008) that overpricing should be more 
prevalent than underpricing, especially under a short-sale constraint. 
Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2007) and Xu (2008) show that the difference in 
the market returns between disclosing firms and non-disclosing firms may be driven 
by investors’ anticipation of the long-term performance of the firms. To examine this 
issue, I follow Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2007) and add three proxies for a firm’s 
future long-term performance in the regression models. The three proxies are long-
run stock return (LR-RET), long-run operating performance measured by the future 
change in earnings (OPER_EPS), and long-run operating performance measured by 
the future change in net income (OPER_NI). The long-run stock return is defined as 
the 1-year holding-period abnormal return. It starts from the month after the earnings 
announcements when I use CAR of the 10-day combined window as the dependent 
variable, and starts from the fourth month after the earnings announcements when I 
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use CAR of the 120-day long window as the dependent variable to reduce the 
overlap between the dependent variable and the independent variable LR-RET. The 
long-run operating performance is defined as the change in earnings per share 
between year 0 and year +1 relative to the earnings forecast year standardized by the 
stock price and the change in net income between year 0 and year +1 standardized by 
total assets. In the regression, I also control for all the variables in the above tables as 
well as time and industry dummies. To conserve space, Table 13 only reports the 
experimental variables of interest. Panel A shows the regression results for the firms 
with extremely good news and bad news in the 10-day combined short window, 
while Panel B only shows the regression results for firms with extremely good news 
since I only find positive stronger market reactions for these firms in the 120-day 
long window (as shown in Tables 11 and 12). 
[Insert Table 13] 
For both the 10-day combined window and the 120-day long window, the 
coefficients on the long-run operating performance proxies are significantly positive, 
which means a positive association between investor reactions to earnings forecasts 
and earnings announcements and the firm’s long-run operating performance. This 
finding is similar to Tawatnuntachai and Yaman’s (2007) results. The evidence is 
consistent with investors (correctly) estimating firms’ future performances and taking 
this into consideration when they react to current earnings information. However, the 
coefficient on the long-term stock return is significantly negative. The negative 
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association between the current returns and the future returns of the disclosing firms 
is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and there is a long-term price reversal 
after a short term overreaction within the 10-days combined window and the 120-day 
long window. Finally, after I control for the proxies of firms’ long-run performances, 
the forecast dummy is still significant. This indicates that the stronger reactions 
cannot be totally attributed to firms’ future performances.  
In order to further illustrate investors’ responses to the earnings information of 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms, Figure 2 presents the average cumulative 
abnormal return within the event window [-60, 60] around the earnings 
announcement date for four extremely negative or positive earnings surprise groups. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
For the non-disclosing firms, the graphs of cumulative abnormal returns around 
earnings announcements are similar to those reported by Bernard and Thomas (1989). 
However, after earnings announcements, the stock prices of disclosing firms move in 
an opposite direction to the earnings surprises suggested. As we can see in Table 14, 
the average CARs [2, 20] are significantly positive for disclosing firms with 
extremely negative earnings surprises and significantly negative for disclosing firms 
with extremely positive earnings surprises. Similar results are found if I use CAR [-1, 
20] to capture the price movement nearly one month after the earnings 
announcement.  
[Insert Table 14] 
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Table 15 presents the regression estimates when using CAR [2, 20] or CAR [-1, 
20] as the dependent variable. For firms with extremely good news, the coefficient 
on the forecast dummy is significantly negative, and for firms with extremely bad 
news, the coefficient on the forecast dummy is significantly positive. This is 
consistent with the results in Table 14.  
[Insert Table 15] 
The 20-day price movements after earnings announcements are also consistent 
with the presence of investor overreaction to management earnings forecasts within 
the short combined window, in which the overreaction is reversed after the earnings 
announcements. 
 
5.2 More Evidence about the Stronger Market Reactions 
One explanation for the overreactions documented above is that in the Chinese 
stock market, where the information environment is weak and reliable firm-specific 
information is scarce, management earnings forecasts can easily capture investors’ 
attention. Extensive attention would bring out intensified buying (selling) pressure, 
which could lead to excessive trading and incorrect valuations of stocks. In addition, 
the individual investors who dominate the Chinese stock market are more susceptible 
to cognitive biases and market sentiment. Their irrational trading strategies such as 
momentum chasing will exacerbate the mispricing. 
38 
 
To provide more evidence on the possible causes of the overreaction, I conduct a 
series of additional regression analyses to examine whether the overreactions in both 
the combined short window and the long window are related to a set of proxies that 
have been used in prior studies to capture shareholder attention.  
The first proxy for capturing attention is D_NO. It is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value one if a management earnings forecast is disclosed on a high 
information day, and takes the value 0 otherwise. Following the same idea as that in 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009), I divide all the management earnings forecasts 
into three groups according to the number of forecasts on the forecast day. I define 
high information days as those days that have the largest number of earnings 
forecasts.  
Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), who show that corporate information 
disclosures on Fridays receive less attention from shareholders, I also create a 
dummy variable (D_FRI) to indicate whether a management earnings forecast is 
disclosed on a Friday. It takes the value 1 if the forecast is disclosed on a Friday and 
0 otherwise.  
As the overreactions to bad and good news may be affected by investor 
sentiments, I create a dummy variable D_BULL to capture the overall market 
sentiment. D_BULL is set equal 1 if a management earnings forecast is disclosed in a 
bull month, and is set equal 0 otherwise5. If the news provided by a management 
                                                            
5 Following Fabozzi and Francis (1977), I define months in which the return of composite index was 
non-negative (negative) as bull (bear) months. 
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earnings forecast is against the overall market sentiment (such as a bad news forecast 
in a bull market), then investors may not believe this news deserves much attention. 
However, if the news is consistent with overall market sentiment (such as a good 
news forecast in a bull market) then investors may exaggerate such information.  
Institutional investors are usually considered to be more sophisticated investors 
who are less likely to overreact to information than individual investors. In order to 
examine how the overreactions relate to investor sophistication, I generate a dummy 
variable relating to institutional ownership (INST). INST is set equal to 1 if a firm-
quarter observation has high institutional ownership, and is set equal to 0 otherwise. I 
define a firm as having high institutional ownership when it is in the top one third of 
all the observations in terms of the institutional shareholding percentage. D_INST is 
the interaction term between DUMMY and INST. I add all these variables as 
controls into the regression models of Table 13 to examine whether they have 
significant impacts on the short-term and long-term overreactions. 
Table 16 reports the results of the additional analyses. To conserve space, I only 
report the variables of interest. The first four columns add D_NO, D_FRI, D_BULL, 
and D_INST, one by one, and the last column includes all the variables. Panel A 
reports the results in the combined short window, while Panel B reports the results in 
the long window. 
[Insert Table 16] 
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According to Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) and DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009), D_NO and D_FRI should serve as good proxies of investor inattention. In 
my study, the coefficients on both of them have the opposite signs to the forecast 
dummy. For the combined short window (Panel A), D_NO is significantly negative 
for firms with good news (as shown in regression 1 of Panel A) and D_FRI is 
significantly positive for firms with bad news (as shown in regressions 7 and 10 of 
Panel A); for the long window (Panel B), D_NO is significantly negative for firms 
with good news (as shown in regressions 1, 5, 6, and 10 of Panel B). This means that 
if management earnings forecasts are disclosed on the days when there is low 
investor attention, the stronger market reactions associated with the forecasts will be 
weaker. According to the Wald test, if an earnings forecast is disclosed on a high 
information day (D_NO=1), then the CAR [-60, 60] of disclosing firms is not 
statistically different from that of the matched non-disclosing firms. The results are 
consistent with the assumption that investor attention is at least part of the reason for 
the overreactions.  
The coefficient on D_BULL is significantly positive for both the combined short 
window and the long window. This indicates that bull markets will weaken 
(exaggerate) the negative (positive) overreaction of disclosing firms with bad (good) 
news. The coefficient on DUMMY is not significantly different from 0 in Panel B, 
which means that for firms with extremely good news there is no difference in the 
120-day market returns between the disclosing firms and the matched non-disclosing 
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firms if the forecasts are disclosed in a bear market. This is consistent with the 
sentiment of investors who are more optimistic in a bull market and pessimistic in a 
bear market. 
In the long window, the interaction term D_INST is significant and the sign of 
its coefficient is also opposite to that of the forecast dummy (as shown in regressions 
9 and 10). The Wald test shows that the joint coefficient on DUMMY plus D_INST 
is not significantly different from 0. This result implies that even though there is an 
overreaction in the short term, such overreaction will be reversed in the 120-day 
window if the firm has relatively high institutional ownership. This finding implies 
more sophisticated investors are helpful in correcting mispricing. It may help explain 
why prior studies have not found long-term overreactions in the US stock market 
because it is dominated by institutional investors. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I investigate the market reactions associated with management 
earnings forecasts in the context of China. By using data on Chinese listed firms, my 
study should be less contaminated by the self-selection problem since management 
earnings forecasts are regulated under the Shanghai Exchange and the Shenzhen 
Exchange. However, I do control for the possible self-selection concern using the 
propensity score matching method. 
I find that management earnings forecasts do provide price-relevant information 
to investors. There are significant market returns around the forecast release day. 
Furthermore, compared with the matched non-disclosing firms, the market reactions 
of the disclosing firms are stronger before the earnings announcements but weaker 
during the 3-days around and after the earnings announcements.  
I also find evidence that is consistent with the presence of overreactions 
associated with management earnings forecasts. Unlike Kasznik and Lev (1995), I 
find stronger market reactions not only for the disclosing firms with extremely 
negative earnings surprises but also for firms with extremely positive surprises over a 
10-day combined short window. As I extend the event window to 120 days, which 
covers the market reactions to earnings forecasts and earnings announcements, I only 
observe a stronger market reaction for disclosing firms with extremely positive 
earnings surprises. The existence and greater prevalence of stronger reactions to 
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good news are consistent with the presence of short-sale constraints in China. When 
further examining such overreactions in both a combined short window and a long 
window, I find that they are significantly related with investor attention, bear or bull 
market status, and institutional ownership of the stock. 
My results suggest that requiring publicly listed firms to issue earnings forecasts 
tend to have mixed effects on the quality of the Chinese stock market. Management 
earnings forecasts tend to improve the efficiency of the market by allowing earlier 
incorporation of relevant earnings information into stock prices. However, by 
comparing the market reactions of disclosing firms and non-disclosing firms, I find 
evidence which shows that management earnings forecasts generate overreaction and 
increase the fluctuations in stock prices, which is less documented in the West. Thus, 
my study offers a cautionary note about the policy of mandating listed firms to issue 
earnings forecasts in a stock market that is dominated by individual investors. 
My study also has implications for future studies on investor reactions to 
earnings announcements in China. Given the differences in the market reactions 
between management forecast disclosing firms and non-disclosing firms, my 
findings should be taken into consideration when future studies analyze the market 
reactions around the earnings announcement period in the Chinese stock market. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. The Probit Model in the Propensity Score Matching 
( 1 )  SUR=1  ( 2 )  SUR=2 
 Coef. z    Coef. z  
SUE -0.601 -12.05 ***   SUE -1.056  -5.74  ***  
LNCAP -0.181 -5.51 ***   LNCAP -0.056  -1.59    
GOV 0.019 0.30    GOV -0.147  -2.05  ** 
B2M -0.099 -1.05    B2M -0.427  -4.05  *** 
PROVAR 0.183 3.34 ***   PROVAR 0.175  2.18  ** 
LEVERAGE -0.062 -0.38    LEVERAGE -0.540  -3.17  *** 
ROE -0.931 -2.54 ***   ROE -1.331  -2.19  ** 
ROE*GOV -0.480 -1.03    ROE*GOV -8.143  -8.09  *** 
CONS 3.263 4.57 ***   CONS 0.655  0.85    
NO 2242    NO 2061    
Pseudo R2 11.98%    Pseudo R2 11.39%   
 
( 3 )  SUR=9 ( 4 )  SUR=10 
Coef. z Coef. z 
SUE 0.983 7.40 *** SUE 0.223  5.04  *** 
LNCAP -0.008 -0.29   LNCAP -0.073  -0.06    
GOV -0.253 -3.97 *** GOV -0.200  -2.48  *** 
B2M 0.043 0.47   B2M 0.123  1.17    
PROVAR -0.060 -2.62 *** PROVAR 0.105  0.62    
LEVERAGE 0.534 3.47 *** LEVERAGE 0.173  0.93    
ROE -0.135 -0.66   ROE 28.033  2.55  *** 
CONS -0.832 -1.32   LNCAP^2 0.002  0.09    
NO 2058 PROVAR^2 -0.004  -0.52    
Pseudo R2 3.17% ROE^2 2.616  1.02    
    LNCAP*ROE -1.178  -2.32  ** 
    CONS 0.667  0.05    
    NO 2067  
    Pseudo R2 4.15% 
 
The probit model shows the incentive of issuance of management earnings forecasts 
for listed firms. The model specification about the second terms and interaction terms 
is decided by whether variables are well matched. From above table we can see that 
the coefficients on SUE are significantly negative for firms with bad news (as shown 
in model (1) and (2)) and significantly positive for firms with good news (as shown 
in model (3) and (4)). It means that the more negative (positive) the earnings surprise 
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is, the more likely a firm discloses a management earnings forecast. GOV is 
significantly negative in model (2) to (4), which shows that state-owned firms have 
less incentive to issue forecasts. PROVAR is significantly positive in model (1) and 
(2). However, it is significantly negative in model (3). So firms are more careful and 
conservative when they have big profit volatility – to disclose forecasts of the bad 
news and not issue forecasts of the good news. Inconsistent with our expectation, 
ROE is significantly negative in model (1) and (2). This may be because that besides 
being a proxy of CEO’s ability, ROE is also related with firm’s operating 
performance. Worse performance is associated with a stronger incentive of 
management forecasts. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. The Evolution of Management Earnings Forecast Provision 
Year Forecast Period Firms have to make earnings forecasts under the following circumstances: 
2001 Annual report 1. make losses; 
2. gross profit changes by greater than |50%|; 
3. small earnings per share last year (smaller than 0.05) 
can be exempt. 
2002 Annual report, 
the half-year 
report, and the 
third quarter 
report 
1. make losses; 
2. net profit changes by greater than |50%|; 
3. small earnings per share last year (0.05 for annual, 0.03 
for half-year, 0.04 for the third quarterly reports) can be 
exempt. 
2006 Annual report, 
the half-year 
report, and the 
third quarter 
report 
1. make losses; 
2. net profit changes by greater than |50%|; 
3. small earnings per share last year (0.05 for annual, 0.03 
for half-year, 0.04 for the third quarterly reports) can be 
exempt; 
4. turn from losses to profit. 
 
Table 2. Frequency of the Different Types of Management Earnings Forecasts 
Type Type code Freq. Percent% Cum%. 
Uncertainty 1 51 0.54 0.54 
Decrease (slightly) 2 243 2.58 3.12 
Increase (slightly) 3 293 3.11 6.23 
Profit again 4 116 1.23 7.46 
Others 5 49 0.52 7.98 
Loss (the first time) 6 1,548 16.43 24.41 
Loss again 7 569 6.04 30.45 
Decrease (substantially) 8 1,526 16.2 46.65 
Loss turning to profit 9 1,418 15.05 61.71 
Increase (substantially) 10 3,606 38.28 100 
Total 9,419 100 
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Table 3. The Percentage of Earnings Forecasts in Extreme Change Groups 
SUR total disclosing non-disclosing 
1 4,003 2,676 66.85% 1,327 33.15% 
2 4,002 1,314 32.83% 2,688 67.17% 
9 4,002 2,130 53.22% 1,872 46.78% 
10 4,003 3,299 82.41% 704 17.59% 
Total 16,010 9,419 58.83% 6,591 41.17% 
SUR represents the earnings surprise group. SUR=1 represents the group with lowest average 
earnings surprise while SUR=10 represents the group with largest average earnings surprise. The 
column of “total” presents the number of observations in each SUR group, which can be divided into 
the disclosing sub-group and the non-disclosing sub-group according to whether there is a 
management earnings forecast before an earnings announcement. 
 
Table 4. Consistency of Earnings Forecasts and Earnings Surprise 
Type SUE>0 SUE<=0 Total 
Loss (the first time) 0 0.00% 1,548 100.00% 1,548 
Loss again 238 41.83% 331 58.17% 569 
Decrease(Substantially) 0 0.00% 1,526 100.00% 1,526 
Loss turning to profit 1,415 99.79% 3 0.21% 1,418 
Increase(Substantially) 3,544 98.28% 62 1.72% 3,606 
Total 5,197 59.96% 3,470 40.04% 8,667 
SUE is the measure of earnings surprise, defined as the difference between the earnings per share this 
quarter minus the earnings per share of the same quarter of the previous year, deflated by the standard 
deviation of earnings per share changes over the last eight quarters. The column of “Total” presents 
the number of observations in each forecast type. 
 
Table 5. The Time Interval between the Earnings Forecasts and the Subsequent 
Earnings Announcements 
Whole Sample 
MIN MAX MEAN 25% 50% 75% 
Calendar Days 0 239 66.74 28 63 95 
Annual Earnings 
MIN MAX MEAN 25% 50% 75% 
Calendar Days 0 239 93.16 54 83 145 
Interim and Quarterly Earnings 
MIN MAX MEAN 25% 50% 75% 
Calendar Days 1 136 52.99 19 50 75 
48 
 
 
Table 6. Mean Test of the Difference of Firm Characteristics 
Covariate SUE LNCAP B2M GOV PROVAR LEV ROE 
 SUR=1 
Disclosing -2.189  21.549  0.487  0.684  0.175  0.513  -0.046  
Matched -2.206  21.554  0.485  0.674  0.156  0.507  -0.046  
 SUR=2 
Disclosing -0.894  21.534  0.459  0.521  0.085  0.468  0.025  
Matched -0.907  21.606  0.434  0.495  0.092  0.460  0.023  
 SUR=9 
Disclosing 1.076  21.899  0.682  0.489  0.147  0.523  0.080  
Matched 1.085  21.918  0.699  0.501  0.167  0.517  0.077  
 SUR=10 
Disclosing 2.457  21.905  0.720  0.520  0.127  0.515  0.105  
Matched 2.438  21.863  0.705  0.524  0.138  0.514  0.103  
SUR represents the earnings surprise group. SUR=1 represents the group with lowest average 
earnings surprise while SUR=10 represents the group with largest average earnings surprise. SUE 
represents the earnings surprise defined by the current earnings change deflated by last 8 quarters’ 
standard deviation; LNCAP represents the firm size which is defined as the log of total market value 
of the firm; B2M represents the book-to-market value which is calculated based on the book value to 
the market capitalization of equity at the end of the previous year; GOV represents the state ownership 
which takes the value of 1 if a firm is controlled by a state-owned entity and takes the value of 0 
otherwise; PROVAR represents the profit volatility which is measured by the standard deviation of 
earnings over the last 8 quarters; LEV represents the firm’s leverage calculated by total debt divided 
by total assets; ROE represents return on equity which is the ratio of net income to shareholders’ 
equity. For each forecast disclosing observation, a one-to-one propensity score matching is performed 
and the matched one is chosen from non-disclosing firms with replacement. 
 
Table 7. Market Reaction to Management Earnings Forecasts 
Type Code Sign CAR[-60,-2] CAR[-1,1] CAR[2,60] 
CAR[-60,-2]/ 
CAR[-60,60] 
Loss (the first time) 6 - -3.23% *** -2.34% *** -0.07% 57.27% 
Loss again 7 - -3.29% *** -2.43% *** -0.21% 55.48% 
Decrease(Substantially) 8 - -3.26% *** -2.45% *** 0.31% 60.37% 
Loss turning to profit 9 + 2.23% *** 2.00% *** 2.66% *** 32.37% 
Increase(Substantially) 10 + 4.65% *** 2.77% *** 2.14% *** 48.64% 
CAR indicates the cumulative abnormal return in a given event window. Here Date 0 is the 
management earnings forecast day. All the days before and after date 0 are trading days. The column 
of “Sign” gives the expected direction of CARs. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 8. Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Extreme Earnings 
Announcements 
CAR[-60,-2] 
SUR Matched Non-disclosing Disclosing Diff 
1 -1.80% *** -4.26% *** 2.47% ** 
2 -0.41% -3.57% *** 3.16% *** 
9 0.29% 3.11% *** -2.82% *** 
10 3.35% *** 4.27% *** -0.92% 
CAR[-1,1] 
SUR Matched Non-disclosing Disclosing Diff 
1 -1.84% *** -0.39% *** -1.45% *** 
2 -0.85% *** -0.27% -0.59% * 
9 1.25% *** -0.15% 1.39% *** 
10 1.33% *** -0.10% 1.43% *** 
CAR[2,60] 
SUR Matched Non-disclosing Disclosing Diff 
1 -1.01% ** -0.24% -0.77% 
2 -1.47% ** 1.33% ** -2.80% ** 
9 1.13% ** 0.44% 0.69% 
10 1.99% *** -0.40% 2.38% * 
CAR indicates the cumulative abnormal return in a given event window. Here Date 0 is the earnings 
announcement day. All the days before and after date 0 are trading days. SUR represents the earnings 
surprise group. SUR=1 represents the group with lowest average earnings surprise while SUR=10 
represents the group with largest average earnings surprise. For each forecast disclosing observation, a 
one-to-one propensity score matching is performed and the matched one is chosen from non-
disclosing firms with replacement. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 9. Regression Estimates of Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements 
Good News 
(1) (2) (3) 
CAR[-60,-2] CAR[-1,1] CAR[2,60] 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t  
DUMMY 1.670  2.35 ** -1.208 -5.80 *** -0.502  -0.77  
SUE -0.200  -0.58 0.054 0.53 0.313  0.96  
LNCAP -3.009  -7.77 *** 0.185 1.77 * -0.530  -1.47  
B2M 1.671  1.54 0.167 0.50 -0.784  -0.74  
MOM 0.038  8.46 *** -0.002 -1.57 -0.017  -4.89  *** 
GOV 0.558  0.81 -0.191 -0.94 0.068  0.11  
PROVAR 0.509  1.38 -0.004 -0.06 -0.466  -1.21  
LEV -1.545  -0.91 -0.382 -0.78 3.640  2.21  ** 
ROE 12.908  2.47 ** 3.520 2.53 ** -5.863  -1.18  
CON 60.480  6.86 *** -2.232 -0.94 13.861  1.72  
N 3679 3679 3679 
R square 6.54% 2.55% 3.80% 
Bad News 
(4) (5) (6) 
CAR[-60,-2] CAR[-1,1] CAR[2,60] 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY -2.990  -4.39 *** 0.980 4.77 *** 1.877  2.87  *** 
SUE 0.278  0.75 0.361 3.37 *** 0.858  2.59  *** 
LNCAP -0.968  -2.37 ** -0.020 -0.18 -1.000  -2.66  *** 
B2M 0.819  0.64 0.138 0.40 0.293  0.26  
MOM 0.031  3.97 *** 0.002 1.03 -0.017  -2.76  *** 
GOV 1.093  1.66 * -0.552 -2.86 *** -0.427  -0.68  
PROVAR 0.596  1.31 -0.019 -0.16 -0.308  -1.07  
LEV -1.666  -0.99 0.074 0.14 0.318  0.20  
ROE 0.035  0.02 -0.100 -0.17 -0.540  -0.28  
CON 17.824  1.84 * -1.822 -0.68 17.269  1.98 ** 
N 3087 3087 3087 
R square 3.24% 2.48% 2.40% 
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The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score 
matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of variance. The dependent variables, 
CARs, are cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements within the given event 
windows. Date 0 is the earnings announcement day. All the days before and after date 0 are trading 
days. Good news means SUE>0, and bad news means SUE<=0. For independent variables, DUMMY 
is the forecast dummy which takes value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts and 
takes the value 0 otherwise; SUE represents the earnings surprise defined by the current earnings 
change deflated by last 8 quarters’ standard deviation; LNCAP represents the firm size which is 
defined as the log of total market value of the firm; B2M represents the book-to-market value which is 
calculated based on the book value to the market capitalization of equity at the end of the previous 
year; MOM refers to stock return momentum calculated by the stock return over the previous 12 
months; GOV represents the state ownership which takes the value of 1 if a firm is controlled by a 
state-owned entity and takes the value of 0 otherwise; PROVAR represents the earnings volatility 
which is measured by the standard deviation of profit over the last 8 quarters; LEV represents the 
firm’s leverage calculated by total debt divided by total assets; ROE represents return on equity which 
is the ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity; CON refers to the constant term. It includes year 
dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for temporal fixed effects and industry 
effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively.  
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Table 10. CARs of the 10-day Combined Window 
SUR Matched Non-disclosing Disclosing Diff 
1 -4.13% *** -8.41% *** 4.28% *** 
2 -4.98% *** -8.01% *** 3.03% * 
9 4.20% *** 7.59% *** -3.39% ** 
10 6.26% *** 8.70% *** -2.44% 
SUR represents the earnings surprise group. SUR=1 represents the group with lowest average 
earnings surprise while SUR=10 represents the group with largest average earnings surprise. For each 
forecast disclosing observation, a one-to-one propensity score matching is performed and the matched 
one is chosen from non-disclosing firms with replacement. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 
 
Table 11. CARs of the 120-day Event Windows 
Interval<=75 calendar days Interval<=60 calendar days 
SUR Matched Non-disclosing Disclosing diff 
Matched 
Non-disclosing Disclosing diff 
1 -4.46% *** -6.30% *** 1.84%  -4.39% *** -7.29% *** 2.90%  
2 -2.58% *** -3.05% *** 0.46%  -3.83% *** -4.51% *** 0.67%  
9 1.44% 5.55% *** -4.12% *** 1.31% 6.02% *** -4.71% *** 
10 5.48% *** 5.62% *** -0.14% 4.76% *** 6.51% *** -1.76% 
Here Date 0 is the earnings announcement day. SUR represents the earnings surprise group. SUR=1 
represents the group with lowest average earnings surprise while SUR=10 represents the group with 
largest average earnings surprise. “Interval” means the days between the management earnings 
forecast day and its corresponding earnings announcement day. For each forecast disclosing 
observation, a one-to-one propensity score matching is performed and the matched one is chosen from 
non-disclosing firms with replacement. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 12. Regression Analysis for Short Window and Long Window CARs – 
Part One 
Panel A. Combined Short Window 
(1) Good News (2) Bad News 
Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY 3.961 4.21 *** -3.697 -3.70 *** 
SUE 0.113 0.22 0.925 1.64 * 
LNCAP -2.830 -5.15 *** -0.719 -1.19 
B2M 1.947 1.14 1.521 0.83 
MOM 0.032 4.97 *** 0.021 2.05 ** 
GOV -0.619 -0.63 -0.561 -0.57 
PROVAR 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.01 
LEV -4.770 -2.05 ** 0.788 0.30 
ROE 21.524 2.28 ** 1.602 0.90 
CON 56.097 4.80 *** 5.007 0.39 
N 3033 2212 
R square 5.05% 3.51% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score 
matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of variance. The dependent variable 
is the cumulative abnormal return within the 10-day combined short window. Good news means 
SUE>0, and bad news means SUE<=0. For independent variables, DUMMY is the forecast dummy 
which takes the value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts and takes the value 0 
otherwise; SUE represents the earnings surprise defined by the current earnings change deflated by 
last 8 quarters’ standard deviation; LNCAP represents the firm size which is defined as the log of total 
market value of the firm; B2M represents the book-to-market value which is calculated based on the 
book value to the market capitalization of equity at the end of the previous year; MOM refers to stock 
return momentum calculated by the stock return over the previous 12 months; GOV represents the 
state ownership which takes the value of 1 if a firm is controlled by a state-owned entity and takes the 
value of 0 otherwise; PROVAR represents the earnings volatility which is measured by the standard 
deviation of profit over the last 8 quarters; LEV represents the firm’s leverage calculated by total debt 
divided by total assets; ROE represents return on equity which is the ratio of net income to 
shareholders’ equity; CON refers to the constant term. It includes year dummies and industry 
dummies in the regressions to control for temporal fixed effects and industry effects; the results are 
not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent 
level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 12. Regression Analysis for Short Window and Long Window CARs – 
Part Two 
Panel B. Long Window 
 Interval<=75 calendar days Interval<=60 calendar days 
(3) Good News (4) Bad News (5) Good News (6) Bad News 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY 2.571  2.41  ** -1.587 -1.53 3.492 3.01 *** -1.986  -1.57 
SUE 0.271  0.46  1.610 2.97 *** 0.140 0.21 1.833  2.92 *** 
LNCAP -3.790  -6.11  *** -1.996 -3.25 *** -3.533 -5.12 *** -1.733  -2.26 ** 
B2M 1.477  0.85  0.399 0.22 2.124 0.96 3.384  1.59 
MOM 0.022  3.04  *** 0.022 2.15 ** 0.030 3.50 *** 0.019  1.44 
GOV -0.461  -0.40  0.530 0.52 0.059 0.05 0.072  0.06 
PROVAR 0.162  0.29  0.349 0.68 0.170 0.28 0.761  1.10 
LEV -1.042  -0.39  -0.588 -0.23 -1.659 -0.52 5.235  1.63 
ROE 26.644  3.02  *** -1.151 -0.55 28.997 2.69 *** 2.683  1.50 
CON 73.313  5.56 *** 36.691 2.67 *** 67.186 4.58 *** 27.522  1.58 
N 2590 2171 2072 1553 
R square 5.69% 3.01% 6.52% 2.77% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score 
matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of variance. The dependent variable 
is the cumulative abnormal return of the 120-day event window centered on the earnings 
announcement day. “Interval” means the days between the management earnings forecast day and its 
corresponding earnings announcement day. Good news means SUE>0, and bad news means SUE<=0. 
For independent variables, DUMMY is the forecast dummy which takes the value 1 for observations 
with management earnings forecasts and takes the value 0 otherwise; SUE represents the earnings 
surprise defined by the current earnings change deflated by last 8 quarters’ standard deviation; 
LNCAP represents the firm size which is defined as the log of total market value of the firm; B2M 
represents the book-to-market value which is calculated based on the book value to the market 
capitalization of equity at the end of the previous year; MOM refers to stock return momentum 
calculated by the stock return over the previous 12 months; GOV represents the state ownership which 
takes the value of 1 if a firm is controlled by a state-owned entity and takes the value of 0 otherwise; 
PROVAR represents the earnings volatility which is measured by the standard deviation of profit over 
the last 8 quarters; LEV represents the firm’s leverage calculated by total debt divided by total assets; 
ROE represents return on equity which is the ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity; CON refers 
to the constant term. It includes year dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for 
temporal fixed effects and industry effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 13. Regression Analysis of Firms’ Long-Run Performance 
Panel A. Combined Short Window 
 Good News Bad News 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY 4.074  4.34  *** 4.164 4.42 *** -3.728 -3.74 *** -3.867  -3.90 *** 
SUE 0.300  0.58  0.280 0.54 1.079 1.93 * 1.259  2.26 ** 
LR_RET1 -1.951  -2.75  *** -1.802 -2.52 ** -2.126 -2.92 *** -3.048  -4.80 *** 
OPER_EPS1 67.540  4.24  *** 21.645 2.61 *** 
OPER_NI1 36.003 2.67 *** 65.119  5.43 *** 
N 3032 3032 2209 2209 
R square 5.86% 5.87% 4.21% 5.77% 
 
Panel B. Long Window 
 Interval<=75 calendar days Interval<=60 calendar days 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY 2.530  2.42  ** 2.431 2.33 ** 3.579 3.12 *** 3.773 3.32 *** 
SUE 0.618  1.04  0.455 0.77 0.354 0.54 0.607 0.94 
LR_RET1 -5.069  -6.45  *** -5.256 -6.49 *** -4.833 -4.91 *** -5.501 -5.79 *** 
OPER_EPS1 125.633  6.54  *** 131.515 5.56 *** 
OPER_NI1 95.235 5.00 *** 124.680 7.72 *** 
N 2589 2589 2071 2071 
R square 9.00% 9.77% 8.84% 10.98% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score 
matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of variance. In panel A, the 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return within the 10-day combined short window, 
while in panel B, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return of the 120-day event 
window centered on the earnings announcement day. “Interval” means the days between the 
management earnings forecast day and its corresponding earnings announcement day. Good news 
means SUE>0, and bad news means SUE<=0. For independent variables, DUMMY is the forecast 
dummy which takes the value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts and takes the 
value 0 otherwise; SUE represents the earnings surprise defined by the current earnings change 
deflated by last 8 quarters’ standard deviation; LR-RET is the long-run stock return performance; 
OPER_EPS is the long-run operating performance measured by the future change in earnings; 
OPER_NI is the long-run operating performance measured by the future change in net income. It 
controls for all the variables that appeared in the previous regressions and it also includes year 
dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for temporal fixed effects and industry 
effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 14. CARs of the Event Windows [-1, 20] and [2, 20] 
CAR[-1,20] 
 Matched Non-
disclosing Disclosing diff 
1 -1.45% *** 0.37%  -1.82% ** 
2 -1.21% *** 1.08% ** -2.29% *** 
9 1.96% *** -1.06% *** 3.02% *** 
10 1.05% *** -1.25% *** 2.31% *** 
CAR[2,20] 
 Matched Non-
disclosing Disclosing diff 
1 0.39%  0.76% *** -0.37% 
2 -0.36%  1.34% *** -1.71% *** 
9 0.71% ** -0.91% *** 1.63% *** 
10 -0.28%  -1.15% *** 0.87% 
CAR indicates the cumulative abnormal return in a given event window. Here Date 0 is the earnings 
announcement day. All the days before and after date 0 are trading days. SUR represents the earnings 
surprise group. SUR=1 represents the subsample with lowest average earnings surprise while SUR=10 
represents the subsample with largest average earnings surprise. For each forecast disclosing 
observation, a one-to-one propensity score matching is performed and the matched one is chosen from 
non-disclosing firms with replacement. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 15. Regression Analysis for the Event Windows [-1, 20] and [2, 20] 
Good News Bad News 
CAR[2,20] CAR[-1,20] CAR[2,20] CAR[-1,20] 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY -0.859  -2.13  ** -2.067 -4.50 *** 1.325 3.38 *** 2.305  5.24 *** 
SUE 0.072  0.37  0.126 0.57 0.137 0.63 0.497  2.07 ** 
LNCAP -0.069  -0.31  0.117 0.48 -0.471 -2.19 ** -0.491  -2.07 ** 
B2M 0.735  1.15  0.902 1.19 0.745 1.01 0.883  1.11 
MOM -0.012  -5.66  *** -0.014 -5.66 *** -0.004 -1.15 -0.003  -0.62 
GOV -0.195  -0.50  -0.386 -0.87 -0.125 -0.32 -0.677  -1.56 
PROVAR -0.238  -1.19  -0.242 -1.09 0.106 0.64 0.087  0.38 
LEV 1.367  1.41  0.985 0.91 0.343 0.34 0.417  0.38 
ROE 0.903  0.28  4.423 1.23 -1.528 -1.36 -1.628  -1.32 
CON 4.228  0.84 1.996 0.36 7.928 1.54 6.106  1.06 
N 3679 3679 3087 3087 
R square 2.52% 2.99% 2.16% 3.28% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score 
matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of variance. The dependent variables, 
CARs, are cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement within the given event 
windows. Date 0 is the earnings announcement day. All the days before and after date 0 are trading 
days. Good news means SUE>0, and bad news means SUE<=0. For independent variables, DUMMY 
is the forecast dummy which takes the value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts 
and takes the value 0 otherwise; SUE represents the earnings surprise defined by the current earnings 
change deflated by last 8 quarters’ standard deviation; LNCAP represents the firm size which is 
defined as the log of total market value of the firm; B2M represents the book-to-market value which is 
calculated based on the book value to the market capitalization of equity at the end of the previous 
year; MOM refers to stock return momentum calculated by the stock return over the previous 12 
months; GOV represents the state ownership which takes the value of 1 if a firm is controlled by a 
state-owned entity and takes the value of 0 otherwise; PROVAR represents the earnings volatility 
which is measured by the standard deviation of profit over the last 8 quarters; LEV represents the 
firm’s leverage calculated by total debt divided by total assets; ROE represents return on equity which 
is the ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity; CON refers to the constant term. It includes year 
dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for temporal fixed effects and industry 
effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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Table 16. Regression Analysis for the Additional Evidence – Part One 
Panel A 
Good News 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY 4.882  4.94 *** 4.380 4.61 *** 2.025 1.87 * 3.448 2.86 *** 2.454 1.80 * 
D_NO. -2.768  -2.61 *** -2.388 -2.22 ** 
D_FRI -1.811 -1.38 -2.220 -1.66 * 
D_BULL 4.102 3.78 *** 4.155 3.75 *** 
INST 0.915 0.50 1.093 0.60 
D_INST 1.695 0.86 1.562 0.79 
N 3032 3032 3032 2869 2869 
R square 6.07% 5.93% 6.35 % 6.47% 7.26% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of 
variance. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return within the 10-day combined short window. Good news means SUE>0. For independent variables, 
DUMMY is the forecast dummy which takes the value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_NO is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if a management earnings forecast is disclosed on the high information day, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_FRI is a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if a management earnings forecast is disclosed on Friday, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_BULL is a dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a 
management earnings forecast is disclosed in an up month and is set equal 0 otherwise; INST is dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a firm-quarter observation has 
high institutional ownership, and is set equal 0 otherwise; D_INST is the interaction term between DUMMY and INST. It controls for all the variables that appeared in 
the previous regressions including proxies of firms’ long-run performance. It also includes year dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for temporal 
fixed effects and industry effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, 
respectively. 
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Table 16. Regression Analysis for the Additional Evidence – Part Two 
Bad News 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY -4.330  -3.87 *** -4.542 -4.47 *** -5.649 -4.58 *** -4.574 -3.76 *** -8.021 -5.20 *** 
D_NO. 1.787  1.57 1.777 1.50 
D_FRI 4.424 2.70 *** 4.881 2.94 *** 
D_BULL 3.297 2.49 ** 3.600 2.59 *** 
INST 0.774 0.41 1.256 0.66 
D_INST 2.199 0.99 1.348 0.60 
N 2209 2209 2209 2056 2056 
R square 4.31% 4.61% 4.51% 4.67% 5.56% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of 
variance. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return within the 10-day combined short window. Bad news means SUE<=0. For independent variables, 
DUMMY is the forecast dummy which takes the value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_NO is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if a management earnings forecast is disclosed on the high information day, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_FRI is a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if a management earnings forecast is disclosed on Friday, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_BULL is a dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a 
management earnings forecast is disclosed in an up month and is set equal 0 otherwise; INST is dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a firm-quarter observation has 
high institutional ownership, and is set equal 0 otherwise; D_INST is the interaction term between DUMMY and INST. It controls for all the variables that appeared in 
the previous regressions including proxies of firms’ long-run performance. It also includes year dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for temporal 
fixed effects and industry effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, 
respectively. 
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Table 16. Regression Analysis for the Additional Evidence – Part Three 
Panel B 
Interval <=75 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY 3.831  3.41 *** 2.693 2.51 ** 0.047 0.04 3.903 2.99 *** 2.364 1.55 
D_NO. -4.568  -3.78 *** -2.928 -2.30 ** 
D_FRI -0.996 -0.64 -1.143 -0.71 
D_BULL 5.249 4.04 *** 5.265 3.89 *** 
INST 4.784 2.42 ** 4.691 2.38 ** 
D_INST -1.826 -0.82 -1.589 -0.72 
N 2589 2589 2135 2439 2439 
R square 9.47% 9.02% 9.60% 9.89% 10.81% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of 
variance. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return of the 120-day event window centered on the earnings announcement day. “Interval” means the days 
between the management earnings forecast day and its corresponding earnings announcement day. For independent variables, DUMMY is the forecast dummy which 
takes the value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_NO is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a 
management earnings forecast is disclosed on the high information day, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_FRI is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a 
management earnings forecast is disclosed on Friday, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_BULL is a dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a management earnings 
forecast is disclosed in an up month and is set equal 0 otherwise; INST is dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a firm-quarter observation has high institutional 
ownership, and is set equal 0 otherwise; D_INST is the interaction term between DUMMY and INST. It controls for all the variables that appeared in the previous 
regressions including proxies of firms’ long-run performance. It also includes year dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for temporal fixed effects 
and industry effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, 
respectively. 
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Table 16. Regression Analysis for the Additional Evidence – Part Four 
Interval <=60 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
DUMMY 4.900  3.96 *** 3.771 3.21 *** 1.130 0.84 5.887 4.17 *** 4.926 2.92 *** 
D_NO. -4.412  -3.15 *** -3.863 -2.66 *** 
D_FRI -1.182 -0.65 -1.419 -0.76 
D_BULL 4.963 3.19 *** 4.923 3.03 *** 
INST 6.579 2.94 *** 6.614 2.96 *** 
D_INST -4.917 -1.96 ** -5.101 -2.04 ** 
N 2071 2071 2071 1967 1967 
R square 9.27% 8.86% 9.32 % 9.81% 10.76% 
The regressions are based on the disclosing firm-quarter observations and their propensity score matched observations. All these models use the White estimator of 
variance. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return of the 120-day event window centered on the earnings announcement day. “Interval” means the days 
between the management earnings forecast day and its corresponding earnings announcement day. For independent variables, DUMMY is the forecast dummy which 
takes the value 1 for observations with management earnings forecasts and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_NO is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a 
management earnings forecast is disclosed on the high information day, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_FRI is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a 
management earnings forecast is disclosed on Friday, and takes the value 0 otherwise; D_BULL is a dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a management earnings 
forecast is disclosed in an up month and is set equal 0 otherwise; INST is dummy variable which is set equal 1 if a firm-quarter observation has high institutional 
ownership, and is set equal 0 otherwise; D_INST is the interaction term between DUMMY and INST. It controls for all the variables that appeared in the previous 
regressions including proxies of firms’ long-run performance. It also includes year dummies and industry dummies in the regressions to control for temporal fixed effects 
and industry effects; the results are not tabulated. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level in two-tailed tests, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1. Time Interval between the Management Earnings Forecasts and the 
Earnings Announcements 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in the Event Window [-60, 60] 
 
The time 0 is the earnings announcement day. The X axis represents how many trading days before 
and after announcement and the Y axis represents cumulative abnormal return. The real line denotes 
the CAR of forecast disclosing firms and the dot line denotes the CAR of the non-disclosing firms. 
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